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Transfer of Patent Rights
By W. LEwIs ROBERTS*
A client presents the following set of facts relating to the
sale of patent rights and requests you, as his attorney, to advise
him as to the legal problems that might arise in a transfer of the
invention.
A and B are the partners of a firm which has held certain
inventions for several years. They are also stockholders of cor-
poration C each holding forty (40) per cent of the capital stock;
the remaining twenty (20) per cent is owned by outsiders. A and
B consult you regarding the possibility of having corporation
C acquire by purchase from the partnership one of the inven-
tions owned by the latter. The partnership holds many patent
rights but so far has never sold any. The partners have been
allowed depreciation on these interests under Section 1231 of
the Revenue Code. The questions as to how the price is to be
fixed is presented, whether the minimum purchase price, honestly
estimated from past commercial royalties, plus or minus actual
receipts, possibly including awards for past and future infringe-
ments, are to be considered. Should "unrealized receivables" be
taken into account under Section 751 and finally, should the
partnership be liquidated before a sale is made to the corpor-
ation?
The first point requiring consideration is the nature of the
interest held by the inventor in his invention. Section 1235 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 undertakes to settle this
question, which gave rise to much confusion in the earlier cases.
Before the adoption of the 1954 Code, inventors who made a
business of inventing and selling their patented products were
classed as professional inventors, and the amounts received were
treated as ordinary income. If on the other hand a person was
not in the business of producing inventions and selling them
* Professor of Law, special assignment, University of Kentucky. A.B., Brown
University; A.M., Pennsylvania State University; J.D., University of Chicago;
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to customers but produced find patented an article which might
or might not be incidental to his regular occupation, he was
classed as an amateur and was given capital gain treatment
if he sold his patent.
Section 1235 of the 1954 Code did away with the distinction
between professional and amateur inventors. It defined an in-
ventor as the creator of the invention, meaning the "first and
original" inventor. The transfer of a patent or patent interest
by a holder is considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset
held for more than six months, regardless of whether payment
is to be made periodically over a period of time or contingent
on "the use or disposition of the property." A holder is defined
by this section as an individual whose efforts have produced the
property or a person who has acquired the same for a "consider-
ation in money or money's worth." Related persons, except
brothers or sisters, are not deemed holders under this section.
A corporation does not qualify as a holder, even though the
corporation is the equitable owner of the patent.'
Thus we see that if the patents are held for investment, the
gain or loss is a capital gain or loss. If the taxpayer, other than
a holder as defined in section 1285(b) (1) and (2), is engaged
in selling patents to customers, any gain or loss therefrom is given
ordinary income treatment.2 Since a partnership cannot be a
holder under the patent law, each member of a partnership who
is an individual qualifies as a holder, and holds a share of any
patent owned by the partnership.'
It is pointed out by a writer on this subject that Section 1235
does not claim to cover all possible situations and that as a con-
sequence resort must be had to decisions under the prior law.
Another authority on this field of law states this fact in the
following words:
The tax consequences of the sale of patents in years to
which this section [Section 1235] is inapplicable, or by in-
dividuals who fail to qualify as 'holders,' or by corpora-
tions, will be governed by the law in effect prior to the
enactment of the 1954 Code.5
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1235(d).
2 P-H 1959 Fed. Tax Serv., Vol. 1, par. 5401, Sec. 1231(b).
RId. par. 5404(d)(2).
4 Frost, "Tax Consequences of Patent Transfers," 7 Stan. L. Rev. 349 (1955).
5 Josepb, "Tax Treatment of Sales and Licenses of Patents," 32 Taxes 803
(1954).
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Our attention is also called to the fact that there are com-
paratively few Supreme Court decisions dealing with patent law.
It was not until the Act of 1948 was passed that a general juris-
diction to review decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals was given. The Supreme Court has seemed very reluc-
tant to grant writs of certiorari in such cases. This reluctance, it
is suggested, may be due to the fact that the Court may believe
that the lower courts possess the expert knowledge necessary
to deal with the matter.0
Many of the cases reviewed by the Supreme Court dealing
with points not expressly covered by Section 1285 have been to
determine whether the transfer in a particular case was an as-
signment of a patent or the granting of a license. In Waterman
v. Mackenzie' it was held that the words in a transfer that "the
sole and exclusive right and license to manufacture and sell" the
patented article throughout the United States were not an as-
signment but a license, and that the assignee was not entitled
to prosecute for infringement. It has been pointed out that it
is the character of the agreement, not the terms used, such as
"licensor" or 'licensee," that is looked to in determining whether
a transfer is a sale or the creation of a license. The Tax Court,
in deciding the often cited case of Meyers v. Commissioner," held
that an exclusive license amounted to a sale of the patent in
question. Annual payments were provided for, designated as
"royalties." "An exclusive license" was granted to "use, manu-
facture and sell the invention."
The question of whether the partnership in such case should
be entitled to the invention or the employee, becomes of interest.
A circuit court, in referring to an agreement between an employer
and an employee that such patents should belong to the em-
ployer, said in Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Dings Magnetic Separator
Co.9 that the contract of employment need not be in writing and
that no formal words are necessary. Where part of the employee's
time is to be used to develop new or improved devices, the
6Gilbert, "The Constitutionality of Supreme Court Review of Patent and
Trademark Decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals," 45 Geo. L. J.
645 (1954).
7 188 U. S. 252 (1891).
8 6 T. C. 258 (1946).
9 16 F. 2d 789 (7th Cir. 1926). See also Dinwiddie v. St. Louis & O'Fallon
Coal Co., 64 F. 2d 803 (4th Cir. 1983).
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patents covering these improvements belonged to the employer.
Where, however, an invention has been made by an employee
outside of his employment, it is held the patent belongs to him.10
Where an invention has been made by a government employee
while discharging duties assigned to him, it has been ruled that
the invention became the property of the United States."
In a very recent decision the defendant was hired at a fixed
salary. There was no specific agreement as to ownership of
patents developed by the employee. The Third Circuit Court
held the employer would be entitled to an assignment of any
patent taken out by an employee by showing: (1) an express
agreement to that effect, or (2) that the employee was hired
to invent and patent devices affecting the subject of the em-
ployment agreement. In the particular case there was no agree-
ment to assign or for the employee to invent.'2 The Court fol-
lowed the line of reasoning laid down in Hapgood v. Hewitt.
3
One of the very first questions for the attorney to consider in
solving the problem presented is whether the transfer of the
patented invention should first be transferred to the corporation
and then to the client or whether the partnership should first
be dissolved and the patent transferred to the partners as indi-
viduals and let them make the transfer to the corporation or
directly to the buyer. Consideration, of course, should be given
the effect the elimination of the partnership or the corporation,
or both, by dissolution, would have on the income taxes of the
partners or their right to possible deductions. There would be
no income created by the transfer to the partners, individually
or otherwise, if the partnership were to be dissolved and its as-
sets divided among them according to their shares in the partner-
ship. In a recent case the appellate court ruled that in liquida-
tion proceedings the proceeds from the sale of pipe that came
into the hand of the liquidating agents as capital assets were
subject to capital gains tax and not ordinary income tax.' 4 This
shows that in dissolving the partnership, the question of whether
a capital gains tax would be payable should be taken into con-
sideration.
'0 Dowse v. Federal Rubber Co., 254 Fed. 308 (D.C.N.D. Ill., 1918).
"1 Houghton v. United States, 23 F. 2d 386 (4th Cir. 1928).
1' DejurAmsco Corp. v. Fogle, 233 F. 2d 141 (3d Cir. 1956).
'3 119 U. S. 226 (1886).
'4 Greenspon v. Commissioner, 229 F. 2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956).
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It is also difficult to see how a transfer by the partners as
individuals to the corporation in which they own the controlling
interest would be of advantage. In the Tax Court decision of
Leo P. Curtin,"a the taxpayer transferred the title of his invention
to a personally controlled corporation in exchange for the right
to receive royalties for seventeen years. It was held that the
transaction was not an assignment of his interest in the patent
that would relieve him from paying income taxes on income
coming to him as assignee. The court said that it is well estab-
lished that such an arrangement did not have "the effect of shift-
ing tax liability on such income and profits."
The United States Supreme Court in 1938 passed upon the
taxability of a shareholder's gain upon liquidation of a cor-
poration. A Treasury Regulation at the time stated that any
gain coming to a stockholder from a distribution in liquidation
should be taxed as a capital net gain in conformity with Section
101 of the Revenue Act of 1928 and Section 115 (c), which are
to be read together. Gains or losses on liquidation of the cor-
poration, the court ruled, "are taxed on the same basis as gains
or losses upon sales and exchanges of property, with the rate
prescribed by Section 101."O
The questions as to the effect of the methods of payment
and conditions incorporated in the agreement transferring in-
terests in patents frequently come before the court. The fact
that payment is to be made in periodic installments has the
approval of the judges. In Commissioner v. Hopkinson,17 making
of lump sum payments did not prevent the transaction from
constituting a sale of capital assets. The payments received
after the transferor's base had been extinguished were taxed as
capital gains. The sum payable for transferor's interest was
dependent upon a percentage of the royalties received by the
buyer. In Kronner v. United States' the patentee gave the "sole
right to manufacture, vend, sell, license or relicense or in any wise
use device covered by patent when issued." It was held a "sale"
within Section 117(a) (1) [I.R.C. 1939] although a clause in
the agreement allowed either party to cancel the agreement
15 16 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. par. 47115, at 894 (1947).
16 White v. United States, 305 U. S. 281, (1938).
17 126 F. 2d 406. (2d Cir. 1942).
18 110 F. Supp. 730, 126 Ct. C1. 156 (1953).
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upon the giving of notice provided for in the agreement. A very
recent case where payments were to be made in installments is
Rollman v. Commissioner.9 Installment payments, the court
ruled, did not prevent the transaction from being a sale of capital
asset.
The 1954 Act incorporates this view in Section 1235(a) (1).
There it is provided that the sale of a patent right or interest
therein shall constitute a sale or exchange of a capital asset
held for more than six months, regardless of the fact that the
amount due the tranferor is (1) "payable periodically over a
period generally coterminous with the transferee's use of the
patent, or (2) contingent on the productivity, use or disposition
of the property transferred."
It is not to be overlooked that Section 751 of the Internal
Revenue Code states that a partner in transferring his interest
in a partnership, in arriving at the market value of his interest
in the partnership property, is to take into consideration the
"(1) unrealized receivables of the partnership," (the amount due
for goods sold on credit, for instance), "or (2) inventory items
of the partnership which have appreciated in value." These
provisions relate to the sale of property other than capital assets
or to services rendered by the partnership.
Since the monopoly granted a patentee expires it the end
of seventeen years, patents are exhaustible assets and come
within the provisions of the income tax law allowing depreci-
ation on the value of the patent.20 In arriving at the basis, the
costs of developing and promoting the patent are "capital ex-
penditures" properly amortizable over the period the patent
runs, the seventeen years, in making deductions from the income
from the patent right.21 It is fair to assume that the patent
holders in the case presented have been allowed depreciation
on any income received from their patent rights, in conformity
with the provisions of Section 1231 of the Code on property
used in trade or business and on property held for producing in-
come, as stated in Section 167.
Any damages the holders of the patent may have recovered
for infringements of their invention while they held the same
10 244 F. 2d 634. (4th Cir. 1957).20 1nt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 12.
21 Massey v. United States, 226 F. 2d 724 (7th Cir., 1955).
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would be subject to income taxes.22 However, where the con-
tract sale of a patent provided that any amounts recovered in
pending suits for infringements shduld belong to the assignor,
who was the inventor, the Tax Court has recently held the re-
ceipts from the pending suits should be held to be a part of the
sales price and taxable to him as a capital gain.23
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, acting under
prior law, pointed out that expenditures made in research and
developing inventions are "capital expenditures" and not deduct-
ible as "ordinary and necessary business expenses." The patent
development expenses must be capitalized and charged to ex-
pense account.24 The same conclusion was reached by the Board
of Tax Appeals in the earlier case of Claude Neon Lights, Inc.
v. Commissioner.25 Section 174 of the U. S. Code deals with
expenditures incurred in experimentation in connection with
one's trade or business which are not chargeable to capital ac-
count (that is, capitalize the research expense), but excludes
property subject to allowance under Section 167 or Section 611.
The former section relates to allowance of depreciation and the
latter to allowance for depletion.
Provisions are made in Sections 1301-1304 for prorating
compensation from employment by an individual or a partner-
ship or derived from an invention or artistic work, or received
from back pay, over a period of time. It is stipulated that
in the case of employment the tax so prorated "shall not be
greater than the aggregate of the taxes attributable to such
part had it been included in the gross income of such indi-
vidual ratably over that part of the period which precedes the
date of such receipt or accrual."
In the case of employment the period covered is thirty-six
months or more from the beginning to the completion of such
employment. In the case of inventions or artistic work the
period covered is twenty-four months or more from the begin-
ning to the completion of the work. The tax in such case is not
to exceed "the aggregate of taxes attributable to such part had
22Bosenzweig v. Commissioner, 1 T. C. 24 (1942).
23 Graham v. Commissioner, 26 T. C. (1956).
24Hart-Bartlett-Sturtevant Grain Co. v. Commissioner, 182 F. 2d 153 (8th
Cir. 1950).
2535 B.T.A. 424 (1937).
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it been received ratably over, in the case of inventions, 60 months,
or the part of the year preceding the close of the taxable year,
whichever is shorter."
Where the taxpayer showed he had conceived the idea and
thought about his invention thirty-six months prior to its com-
pletion but had not begun actual work on the same, it was held
he failed to qualify for the benefits of the section covering in-
ventions.26
The problem of fixing the basis of transferred property has
given rise to a great deal of litigation. The establishing of a
basis comes up most often in determining the tax arising out of
the transaction. This may be for computing the income tax to
be paid or it may be for determining the amount to be allowed
for yearly depreciation in computing the capital gain or loss if
the purchaser sells the property he has acquired. In any case,
it will generally be the fair market value of the property at the
time it is acquired that will be approximated. In a fairly early
case it was held that in reporting income from the taxpayer's
sale of sugar the taxpayer might deduct from his gross returns
his cost and expenses, attributable to the production of such
income.
The court is not, however, in such case obliged to accept the
taxpayer's figures as to the cost of any improvements made.
28
It can be added that in the fair market value of property acquired
by descent, for instance, the figures reached at such time are
only prima facie correct and may be shown to be erroneous.29
If stock is taken in payment for a debt of a solvent debtor, the
amount of the cancelled debt is taken as the basis 30 In Parsons
v. United States,"- it was said the basis of property should be the
cost to the taxpayer as represented by his outlay, "measure of
his recoupment through depreciation accruals."
In case of a partner computing his net gains or losses from
the sale of property used in his trade or business, he is re-
quired by law to include his share of partnership gains or losses
2 6 Beardsley v. U. S., 140 F. Su p. 541 (D. Conn. 1956).2 7 United States v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 12 F. 2d 755 (10th Cir. 1934).
2 8 Lipsitz v. Commissioner, 200 F. 2d 871 (4th Cir. 1955).
29 McEwan v. Commissioner, 241 F. 2d 887 (2d Cir. 1957).
30 Owen v. Commissioner, 134 F. Supp. 31 (D. Neb. 1955), appeal dismissed,
232 F. 2d 893.
31227 F. 2d 437 (3d Cir. 1955).
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as stated in Section 1001 of the Code.3 2 As pointed out in a deci-
sion of a year ago, 3 in adjusting gains or losses from sales of
property, wherever acquired, the provision as to time elements
"broadens" to include property transmitted by death.34 The
fact that property enhances in value does not give the owner a
taxable gain.33
The "first in first out' rule was applied by the Tax Court in
Kaleck v. Commissioner,3" where a corporation did not indicate
whether payments to stockholders were long term or short term
in returning advances made by the stockholders upon the dis-
solution because of failure of business. The sums returned were
applied to the earliest advances made by the stockholders. In
the case of Hamilton v. Commissioner,37 a building was pur-
chased under an agreement whereby it was stipulated the ten-
ant should restore the building to its former condition to the
extent of $10,000. The purchaser released the tenant from this
obligation. This amount, $10,000, was deducted in computing
the purchaser's cost basis. In another case before the Tax Court,
a taxpayer purchased two public utility corporations, including
all the outstanding stock of one and the outstanding securities
of the other. The purchaser liquidated the newly acquired sub-
sidiaries and assumed their liabilities. It was held that the basis
of the taxpayer's purchases was the price of the stock and securi-
ties plus the amount of the liabilities.
3
8
A taxpayer petitioning the Tax Court for a redetermination of
income and excess profits taxes assessed in 1944, 1945 and 1946
increased cost basis of depreciable items of another corporation
the taxpayer purchased in 1929. It erred in failing to deduct
allowable depreciation on cost accession or increment from 1929
to 1944 as well as depreciation thereafter actually allowed for
such period.3 9
The cases already considered, which have fixed the cost
basis of property acquired as the fair market value at the time
32 Commissioner v. Paley, 232 F. 2d 915 (9th Cir. 1956); cert. denied, 352
U. S. 838 (1956).
33 Supra note 29.
34 Commissioner v. Murphy's Estates, 229 F. 2d 569 (6th Cir. 1956).
35 Commissioner v. Summer's Estates, 231 F. 2d 909 (4th Cir. 1956).
36 23 T. C. 672 (1955).
3 7 25 T. C. 878 (1956).38 Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T. C. 408 (1955).
39 Commissioner v. Superior Yarn Mills, 228 F. 2d 736 (4th Cir. 1955).
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of the purchase, have the support-of a recent holding in the
United States Supreme Court. One case, where certiorari was
denied by the Supreme Court, the taxpayer, who owned a
half-interest in a corporation, purchased the other half in the
corporation and dissolved the corporation. He had half the
assets transferred to himself and his wife. The property thus
acquired took its cost basis for income tax purposes as the fair
market value at the time of the dissolution of the corporation.4"
This is in keeping with Section 384 of the Code, which gives the
general rule that if property is received in a distribution in
partial or complete liquidation and a gain or loss is recognized
on the receipt of the property, the basis of the property in the
hands of the distributee shall be the fair market value of the
property when distributed.41 Exceptions pointed out in the
Code are (1) property distributed pursuant to a plan adopted
on or after June 22, 1954, and (2) where more than two years
after the date of transaction have elapsed.
The basis for assets purchased is, as a general rule, held to be
the cost,4 but in the case of Georgia Properties Co. v. Henslee4 3
a different result was reached. The corporation owning an office
building refused to sell the building. One desiring to purchase
the building purchased all the outstanding shares of the cor-
poration and liquidated the company. It transferred the shares
bought in exchange to the corporation in liquidation. The
amount the taxpayer paid for the stock was held to be the basis
for computing the depreciation on the building acquired in the
liquidation proceeding. The taxpayer was not required to use
the adjusted basis of the assets of the corporation in computing
depreciation.
The Code goes into detail in the matter of finding the basis
for property acquired by transfer and many sections are devoted
to the subject of determining the gains or losses the transferee
is required to consider in his computations, whether the prop-
erty be acquired by purchase, descent or gift. It also considers
what costs and expenditures he can add to the price paid. As
shown by the court decisions already considered, the basis to
40 Lipsitz v. Commissioner, 220 F. 2d 871 (4th Cir. 1955), Cert. denied, 350
U. S. 845 (1955).
4126 U. S. C. A., § 334 (a) (1954).
4 2 Brown v. Commissioner, 24 T. C. 27 (1956). 5
43 138 F. Supp. 587 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
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be taken, as a general rule, is the fair market value at the time
the acquisition takes place. In the case of the dissolution of a
corporation, it is laid down that the "basis of the property in
the hands of the distributee shall be the adjusted basis of the
stock with respect to which the distribution was made."44
In the case of a partnership other than in a liquidation of the
partnership, the partner's interest in the firm is reduced by the
amount he takes out, but not below zero. An optional basis
is allowed by the Code.45 Where the property comes to the
holder by descent4 6 or gift4 the method of determining the basis
is stated to be the fair market value of the property in the for-
mer case at the date of the decedent's death and in the latter
case the basis of the property in the hands of the donor. In the
case of the descent of the property an alternative method is
provided for at the election of the transferee.48
Applying those principles and rules so far considered to the
facts presented in the hypothetical case stated at the outset, it
seems clear that the gain or loss from the partnership sale of the
patent right it has held for some time results in a capital gain or
loss. The result would be otherwise for other than a holder as
defined in section 1235(b) (1) and (2) if it had been in the prac-
tice of selling such inventions to customers; the gain or loss in
such case would be an ordinary gain or loss and taxable as such.
The same result would have been reached under the law in force
before the adoption of the 1954 Code.
The basis of valuation would be the original cost provided
it was the fair market value, less the depreciation allowed dur-
ing the time the patent was held. Depreciation on patent rights
is worked out on the basis of seventeen years, since a patent
right runs for that period. Any expense or outlay on the prop-
erty right held will also be deducted, and any income from the
patent or any sum recovered in suits for inTringement of the
patent would be added to amount received. While the partner-
ship as such may hold the title to the patent, the partners,
4426U. S.C.A., § 834 (b) (2) (B) (1955).45 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 733, 751-55.
46 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014.
47 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1015.4 8 Election allowed under Section 2032 of the 1954 Code or Section 811()
of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939 results in such elected value forming the basis of the
property in the hands of the recipient. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014.
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if they qualify as holders under the terms of the statute, are
deemed the holders of the patent right. From this fact it would
seem that the liquidation of the partnership would be largely
a matter of bookkeeping.
Turning to the case presented: the corporation was regularly
engaged in business and was not a "dummy" created for the pur-
pose of making the sale or transfer of the patent. Furthermore, the
holders of the 20% of the corporate stock were not related per-
sons to whom the statute forbids conveyance. If the holder of
the patent right owned more than a 50% interest in the corpor-
ation it might be treated as a transfer to a related person, and
as a result, under section 1235, the holder would not be entitled
to capital gain treatment. It has been pointed out that an in-
vention would not be a capital asset in such a case.49 What was
to be regarded as a capital asset was considered in Section 117
(a) (1), I.R.C. (A) as amended in 1941. It did not include
property held primarily for sale to customers, nor property used
in trade or business which was subject to allowance for depreci-
ation under Section 23 (1). The court, in Lamar v. Granger,"0
says, "However, in general so far as patents are concerned, if
the income-producing activity in connection with a patent is an
isolated or casual affair or a mere hobby or recreation, the patent
is a capital asset."
Since the particular invention in question had been held by
the partnership for several years and had not been offered for
sale to the firm's customers, a court should hold that it was a
capital asset and subject to capital gain treatments. It is diffi-
cult to find under the circumstances how there would be any
advantage gained by transferring the patent right to the cor-
poration and allowing it to pass it on to a would-be buyer.
Finally, in arriving at a basis for valuation of the patent
right, any awards for infringements of the patent should, of
course, be taken into consideration. As we have seen, if the
damages from infringement are recovered before the patent
has been sold, the proceeds are taxed as ordinary income. If
recovered after the sale, the damages are treated as though a
part of the sale price.
49 Andrew W. Bailey, 15 N.Y. U. Institute of Federal Taxation 285, 310
(1957).
5099 F. Supp. 17, 41 (W. D. Pa. 1951).
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